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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Amicus curiae Society of Professional Journalists, Utah 
Headliners Chapter ("SPJ"), adopts the questions presented in the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at pages iv-v. In particular, 
this brief addresses: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it refused to 
consider whether statements in a newspaper political opinion 
column that an elected official changed his position on an issue 
of public concern after a political campaign are protected 
opinion under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err when it decided that 
statements in a newspaper political opinion column that an 
elected official changed his position on an issue of public 
concern after a political campaign are not protected opinion 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in suggesting that a 
newspaper publisher seeking prepublication legal review of an 
opinion column is evidence of actual malice? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in suggesting that a 
newspaper's publication of a rebuttal letter to the editor is 
evidence that an accompanying opinion column was published with 
actual malice? 
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5. Did the Court of Appeals err when it held that a 
statement in a newspaper opinion column that an elected official 
during a political campaign "attempted to manipulate the press" 
is capable of defamatory meaning under Utah law? 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals decision has not been published. 
A copy of the slip opinion is attached as Appendix A to the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals decision was filed on May 28, 
1992. This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The constitutional and statutory provisions relevant to 
this case are set forth in Appendix B of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Amicus curiae SPJ adopts the Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for Review set 
forth on pages 1-7 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
This case is about freedom of the press to report and 
comment on politics. The free expression "constitutional guaran-
tee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 
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conduct of campaigns for public office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. 
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971). If the Court of Appeals 
decision in this case were the final word, it would produce a 
chilling shrinkage of the marketplace of ideas and deviate from 
established constitutional norms. Press coverage of politics and 
constitutional freedoms would suffer. 
The Court of Appeals decision is divided into three 
sections entitled "Opinion Privilege," "Actual Malice," and 
"Manipulation of the Press." Each section is flawed. This brief 
will point to a few of the more serious errors. In each 
instance, the standard for this Court's discretionary review set 
forth in Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure—"special and important reasons"—is satisfied. 
I. FLAWS IN THE OPINION PRIVILEGE ANALYSIS 
A. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Failed to 
Address Whether Article I. Section 15 of the 
Utah Constitution Protects the Statements at 
Issue 
The Court of Appeals refused to consider whether the 
The Daily Spectrum opinion column statements regarding Mr. West's 
position on municipal power are protected under Article I, 
section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "No law 
shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or 
of the press." The court below said this issue had not been 
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raised in the trial court• West v. Thompson Newspapers, No, 
910066, slip op. 7 n.5 (Utah App. May 28, 1992) ("West"). 
The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of fact and law. 
First, the protection of Article I, section 15 of the Utah 
Constitution was in fact raised as an affirmative defense in 
petitioner's answer to the complaint, and petitioner's counsel 
argued that the Utah Constitution protected the statements at 
issue at oral argument in support of summary judgment. Moreover, 
the opinion privilege question generally has been a centerpiece 
of this lawsuit. 
Second, in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988), this 
Court declared: "Our long-standing rule is that this Court may 
affirm a judgment of a lower court on a ground other than that 
relied on by that court." Id. at 561 (citations omitted). The 
trial court in Cox dismissed the plaintiffs' defamation claim on 
First Amendment grounds. On appeal, this Court held that "the 
First Amendment does not bar the defamation action," but nonethe-
less affirmed the dismissal because the complaint failed to state 
a defamation claim under Utah law. Id. at 561-62. 
In the instant defamation case, the trial court granted 
summary judgment on the opinion privilege issue based on the 
First Amendment. If, as in Cox, the First Amendment does not bar 
the action, affirmance of the trial court would nonetheless be 
appropriate, as in Cox, if the statements at issue are otherwise 
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protected as opinion under Utah law—in this case, the Utah 
Constitution. 
Amicus curiae SPJ filed a brief in the Court of Appeals 
addressing state constitutional protection of opinion under 
Article I, section 15, and proposes to do the same in this Court 
if certiorari is granted. The Court of Appeals erred in failing 
to address this important question of state constitutional law, 
"which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme 
Court." Rule 46(d), Utah R. App. P. 
B. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Applied 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. to the 
Statements at Issue 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. . 110 S. Ct. 2695 
(1990), the United States Supreme Court concluded that lower 
courts had been mistaken in thinking that there is a 
free-standing First Amendment privilege for opinion. Instead, 
the proper analysis asks whether a statement on a matter of 
public concern can be proven as false. Id. at 2706. If it 
cannot, then there is First Amendment protection. See Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
In deciding whether the The Daily Spectrum statements 
in this case are protected under Milkovich. the Court of Appeals 
fell into a linguistic trap that produced faulty analysis and 
deprived the petitioners their full scope of constitutional 
protection. If allowed to stand, this cramped interpretation of 
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Milkovich risks unnecessary self-censorship of editorial opinion 
writing about politics. 
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize a common 
distinction in defamation law between statements that on their 
face may be false and defamatory and statements' implications 
that may be false and defamatory. This is a defamation-by-
implication case. See R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related 
Problems 50-51 (1980). The statements on their face said that 
Mr. West changed his position on municipal power after the 1987 
election. As the lower court concluded, that statement can be 
proved true or false. However, it is not defamatory. What 
troubles Mr. West is the arguable implication that he misled his 
constituents. That implication, under Milkovich. is protected 
under the First Amendment because it cannot be proven true or 
false. 
The fallacy in the lower court's opinion is that it 
erroneously combined the nondefamatory factual statements about 
Mr. West changing his position on municipal power with the 
possible implication that he misled constituents. The Court of 
Appeals asserted that "the connotation" of the opinion columns 
could "be proven false by proving the underlying factual 
1
 "[A]n embarrassing, even though false, statement that does 
not damage one's reputation is not actionable as libel or slan-
der." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). 
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assertion false," West, slip op. 12, but the former hardly 
follows logically from the latter. Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals decision misapplied Milkovich, and, in light of "the 
special and important" First Amendment consequences of this 
error, should be reviewed by this Court. Rule 46, Utah R. App. 
P. 
II. FLAWS IN THE ACTUAL MALICE ANALYSIS 
Amicus curiae SPJ wishes to focus on two flaws in the 
lower court's actual malice analysis that would have profound 
consequences on reporting and editorial practices and that should 
receive this Court's review. 
A. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Suggested 
that Evidence of the Press Seeking Legal 
Advice During the Editorial Process Is 
Probative of Actual Malice 
Although lacking precision on this point, the lower 
court's majority opinion appears to suggest that prepublication 
legal review of newspaper copy may be evidence of New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice": "knowledge that [the publica-
tion] was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not." 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). West, slip op. 
14-15. Any such suggestion would turn New York Times on its 
head, undermine responsible reporting and editorial 
decision-making, and compromise the attorney-client relationship 
in the field of journalism. 
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If anything, evidence that a reporter or editor con-
sulted counsel before publication should be probative that the 
reporter or editor had not "in fact entertained serious doubts as 
to the truth of the publication." St. Amant v. Thompson. 390 U.S. 
727, 731 (1968). Courts have relied in part on evidence of 
prepublication legal review to grant summary judgment in libel 
cases on the ground of lack of actual malice. See, e.g. , 
Cervantes v. Time. Inc.. 464 F.2d 986, 994 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied. 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & 
Tribune Co.. 425 F. Supp. 1075 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd. 557 F.2d 
107 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Cardillo v. 
Doubledav & Co.. 366 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd. 518 F.2d 
638 (2d Cir. 1975) . 
Where, as here, a defamation defendant chooses to waive 
the attorney-client privilege and subject both attorney and 
client to discovery, this should demonstrate the defendant's lack 
of subjective doubt in light of the reporter's or editor's 
caution and responsibility to review the proposed publication and 
its sources with counsel. See R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and 
Related Problems 221 (1980). Where, as here, with the 
attorney-client privilege waived, there is no evidence that the 
defendant expressed doubt about accuracy to counsel or published 
against advice of counsel or that counsel expressed concern about 
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legal risk that went unheeded, it would be unprecedented for the 
fact of prepublication legal review to defeat summary judgment 
and create a jury issue as to whether defendant published with a 
"high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity." Garrison 
v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
The widespread practice of prepublication legal review 
is the product of news organizations seeking to secure their 
reputations for "accuracy and fairness." B. Sanford, Libel and 
Privacy (2d ed. 1991). The Court of Appeals' analysis would 
likely produce less responsible journalism by discouraging a 
reporter or editor facing legal uncertainty from seeking counsel 
out of fear that doing so would create defamation liability 
exposure. Not only would this hamper responsible editorial 
decisionmaking and compromise First Amendment protections, it 
would undermine the policy underlying the attorney-client rela-
tionship of encouraging the client to engage in full and frank 
communication with counsel. This important question of "federal 
2
 In Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), rev'd. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.)# cert, denied sub nom. 
Hotchner v. Doubledav & Co., 434 U.S. 834 (1977), the trial judge 
denied summary judgment for defendant because, among other 
things, the publisher disclosed that its lawyers were concerned 
that the publication's statements "border on ' malice' (in the 
legal sense)." The publisher did revise the text, but did not 
intend to change the substance and did not further check the 
accuracy. 404 F. Supp. at 1048-49. 
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[constitutional] law . . • should be . . . settled by the Supreme 
Court." Rule 46(d), Utah R. App. P. 
B. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Suggested 
that Publication of a Rebuttal Letter to the 
Editor Is Probative of Actual Malice 
Again lacking definitiveness, the majority opinion 
appears to accept Mr. West's contention that the The Daily 
Spectrum's publication of his rebuttal letter to the editor, 
irrespective of its content, is circumstantial evidence that an 
accompanying article was published with actual malice. West, 
3 . . . . 
slip op. 14. The decision to publish the letter, if anything, 
evidences confidence in the accompanying column and a remarkable 
attempt to be fair to Mr. West. Courts generally regard evidence 
of reporting both sides of a controversy as demonstrating lack of 
actual malice. For example, in Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 
987 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), a reporter contacted a highway patrol 
officer and a truck driver. The driver claimed the patrolman had 
harassed him. The newspaper published an article reporting both 
sides of the dispute, and the patrolman sued for defamation. The 
3
 Regardless of the form it takes—letter to the editor, 
face-to-face interview, telephone conversation, copies of preex-
isting material—rebuttal information provided by the person who 
is the subject of an article to the publisher may create doubt 
about the accuracy of the work in progress and be probative of 
actual malice if the publisher proceeds to publish in the face of 
this information. That is not the issue raised here. The only 
question is whether the publisher's decision to publish a rebut-
tal letter to the editor is itself evidence of actual malice. 
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court granted summary judgment because the patrolman's "denials 
would not support an inference that [the reporter] acted with 
reckless disregard in writing a story containing both versions 
rather than withholding the story altogether." Id. at 992-93. 
The Court of Appeals' approach would discourage the 
press from publishing comment, even denials, from those who are 
the subject of critical reporting or from publishing information 
in the face of denials altogether because doing so would increase 
the risk of creating a jury issue on the question of actual 
malice. This deterrent hardly serves the core purpose of the New 
York Times First Amendment actual malice standard of diminishing 
"self-censorship." 376 U.S. at 279. Indeed, the The Daily 
Spectrum's willingness to publish a lengthy letter from Mr. West 
furthers the "profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and 
wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964). This important question of "federal [constitutional] law 
. . . should be . . . settled by the Supreme Court." Rule 46(d), 
Utah R. App. P. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A STATEMENT 
THAT MR. WEST ATTEMPTED TO MANIPULATE THE PRESS IS 
CAPABLE OF DEFAMATORY MEANING 
The trial court in this case correctly held that the 
newspaper's allegation that Mr. West attempted to manipulate the 
press is not defamatory as a matter of law. The Court of 
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Appeals, relying on a secondary dictionary definition rather than 
the political and editorial context in which the statement was 
made, decided this is a jury issue. West, slip op. 16-18. 
No politician or public official would welcome charges 
of manipulating the press and many indeed may find such charges 
offensive. However, "[a] publication is not defamatory simply 
because it is nettlesome or embarrassing to a plaintiff, or even 
because it makes a false statement about the plaintiff." Cox v. 
Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). As Judge Garff correctly 
concluded in his dissenting opinion in this case, "the statements 
are not defamatory as a matter of law because they do not 
'impeach [West's] honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or 
publish his . . . defects or expose him . . . . to public hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule.'" (quoting Cox. 761 P.2d at 561, and 
citing Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-2(1) (1988)). West, slip op. 19. 
The statement at issue here should be held to be both 
nondefamatory and protected opinion. 
The context of the remarks is crucial to deciding 
whether the statements are merely critically unflattering or 
defamatory. See B. Sanford, Libel and Privacy 98 (2d ed. 1991). 
Courts frequently dismiss as nonactionable sharp commentary made 
in the setting of public debate. For example, in Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), the 
Supreme Court of the United States found protected and non-
42-
libelous a newspaper's republication of a speaker's comment at a 
city council meeting accusing the plaintiff of "blackmailing" the 
city in pending negotiations. In a case directly on point, a 
radio station's allegation that a mayor running for reelection 
was a "deceptive individual" who "often misleads, if not bla-
tantly lies" to reporters was found not libelous. Craig v. 
Moore. 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1402 (Fla. Cir. 1978). 
On this issue the decision below appears to be in 
conflict with this Court's decision in Cox and with Milkovich as 
well. It merits review under Rule 46(b),(d), Utah R. App. P. 
CONCLUSION 
This case has the potential to have a significant 
impact on press reporting and editing about politics in the State 
of Utah and perhaps other jurisdictions as well. The Court of 
Appeals decision would likely induce press self-censorship in 
conflict with press freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and the Article I, section 15 
of the Utah Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, amicus 
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curiae SPJ respectfully urges this Court to grant the Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted, 
June 19, 1992 By 
Attorney for Society of 
Professional Journalists, 
Amicus Curiae 
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